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Abstract 
 
Climate change is projected to have a devastating impact on the American coast, yet coastal 
communities and states have largely failed to prepare for projected impacts. This is in large part 
due to a lack of resources. This thesis analyzes innovative federal policy mechanisms that will 
address the current gap between actions and forecasted impacts, and will make U.S. coastal 
communities more resilient in the face of climate change.  
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Executive Summary 
  
Climate change is projected to impact the coasts to a greater extent than any other 
geographic region in the United States. Climate impacts will have significant adverse effects on 
coastal communities, where 40 percent of Americans live, on assets and properties, and on 
regional and nationwide economies. Cumulative damage will reach into the trillions of dollars. 
Despite these foreboding projections, localities have largely failed to prepare for new and 
increased vulnerabilities and states have failed to increase resilience on a larger scale and 
influence local actions, in large part due to lack of resources. The federal government has failed 
to adequately fund resilience and has contributed to inadequate standards. To prevent 
catastrophic losses, coastal communities must adapt to climate change and build resilience 
against its impacts. Although adaptation and resilience are inherently local issues dependent on a 
specific area’s risk profile, the federal government must implement policy mechanisms that will 
address the gap between risk and action and enable communities to sufficiently prepare for 
climate change. 
In order to identify policies that would achieve this goal at the federal level, this thesis 
looks to state-level policies to identify scalable best practices, analyzes innovative federal policy 
proposals, and examines existing policies that could be expanded. Based on this analysis, the 
following recommendations are made: 
1.  The President should seek Congressional approval to create a new agency 
dedicated to resilience, to be housed under the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The agency should include an Office of Coastal Resilience and should 
consolidate existing relevant offices and funding sources. The agency should 
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utilize climate science to inform funding decisions. The agency should also 
appoint deputy administrators who concurrently hold other positions in federal 
departments. 
2.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should institute 
stronger mandatory minimum floodplain standards based on 500-year flood 
standards, to be phased in over a set number of years. The NFIP should expunge 
policyholders who do not comply with these standards within the allotted period 
of time. FEMA should also follow through on the implementation of the National 
Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) Risk Rating 2.0. 
a. Congress should supplement these new standards by approving 
resilience tax credits for low-income home and business owners enrolled 
in the NFIP, to alleviate financial strain and mitigate inequitable 
outcomes. 
3.  The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) should identify areas which may be 
amenable to Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) expansion. 
4.  FEMA should add a credit proposed Disaster Deductible that would 
incentivize states to adopt administrative authorities similar to the Coastal 
Protection and Restoration Authority in Louisiana, and should continue to refine 
the proposed Deductible in cooperation with Congress and state partners. 
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Introduction 
  
Climate adaptive measures are not yet common in the U.S. (Bierbaum et al., 2013). 
Fewer than 1 percent of U.S. cities have begun to plan adaptation measures for climate change, 
and they have engaged with adaptation policies at a lower rate than cities in any other country 
(Hansen, Gregg, Arroyo, Ellsworth, Jackson, & Snover, 2013; Aylett, 2014). Despite these clear 
deficiencies, cities are still doing more than state and federal governments (Bierbaum et. al, 
2013). A primary reason for the lack of action is funding; many localities simply do not have the 
resources to invest in the multi-billion dollar adaptive measures often necessitated by the scale of 
climate change.  Given the lack of state and local funding, the federal government must step up 1
to provide coastal communities with adequate levels of funding, incentives, and other 
mechanisms to enhance coastal resilience to climate change. Neglecting this obligation will have 
catastrophic results for people, property, and regional and nationwide economies. 
Anthropogenic climate change is no longer an abstract idea, but a quantifiable reality. 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have caused changes in Earth’s climate, resulting in a number 
of physical impacts, including sea level rise (SLR), more frequent and intense hurricanes, and 
erosion. Following global trends, sea levels are projected to rise 0.5-1.2 meters in the U.S. under 
every emissions scenario, while Category 4 and 5 hurricanes in the Atlantic region may increase 
in frequency by between 45% and 87% (Kopp et al., 2014; Knutsen et al., 2013). 
Historically, only 15% of the hurricanes that have made landfall in the U.S. have been a 
Category 4 or 5, yet they have caused nearly 50% of historical hurricane damage (Pielke et al., 
1 ​ ​See literature review for a more comprehensive overview. 
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2008). Since 1980, tropical storms, including hurricanes, have caused 55% of billion-dollar 
disaster damages - the highest proportion of any disaster type (Smith, 2019). More frequent 
hurricanes of a high intensity will cause immense damages, putting coastal communities in 
danger and straining government resources. The U.S. has already seen what happens when such 
intense events occur in quick succession: between 2016 and 2018, the U.S. was hit by six 
hurricanes which caused over $1 billion in damages each, totaling nearly $330 billion in 
cumulative damages (Smith, 2019). Coastal flooding frequency has also increased dramatically 
in the U.S. due to SLR, particularly along the East and Gulf coasts. Some locations have seen 
coastal flooding increase by as much as ten times since 1950. (EPA, 2016). 
Projections indicate that coastal communities may face the greatest physical damages 
from climate change (Kopp et al., 2014; Hsiang et al., 2017). Studies have shown that between 
$66 and $106 billion worth of coastal property will likely be below sea level by 2050 under 
current emissions trends, and as much as $507 billion by 2100; that rising storm surge levels due 
to SLR will cause an average increase of $2 to $3.5 billion in damages per year as soon as 2030; 
and that average annual damages from hurricanes could increase by over 50 percent to $22 
billion by 2050 (Kopp et al., 2014). The Fourth National Climate Assessment projects even more 
dire results, with as much as $3.5 trillion in cumulative property damage in coastal counties by 
2060 (​U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2018​). 
The U.S. can reduce the extent of these projected damages through adaptation and 
resilience. Resilience is a framework-based approach to climate change focused on the ability to 
absorb shocks and bounce back to normal conditions. Adaptation is a subset of resilience which 
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refers to actions meant to reduce risk.  Sufficient adaptation could reduce cumulative property 2
damage to $800 billion (USGCRP, 2018). 
However, the cost of adaptation is often prohibitive, especially given the fact that 
adaptation projects can have long timescales to completion and may not become useful for a 
number of years. Cost estimates of national and sectoral-level adaptation are highly variable, 
limited in their scope, and are generally believed to be understated (Sussman et al., 2013).  3
Nonetheless, they are useful for inferring the scale of the problem. Only one publication has 
compiled regional and sectoral cost estimates for adaptation in the U.S. It found that 
expenditures for nationwide adaptation could span from tens of billions to hundreds of billions of 
dollars per year. In coastal areas, studies have estimated that the cumulative costs of adaptation 
(of varying degrees and types) by 2100 range between $43.4 billion and $1 trillion, the most 
recent of which estimated that sufficient sea walls, bulkheads, and beach nourishment alone 
would cost $210 billion (Sussman et al., 2013). However, investing in resilience produces more 
benefits than costs. One study found that as much as $11 were saved for every $1 invested in 
natural hazard mitigation strategies (NIBS, 2018). Although cost estimates for coastal adaptation 
are extremely variable, they point to one reality: that the cost of building resilience will be 
exceptionally high, but the cost of doing nothing will be even greater. 
The climate impacts that have already begun and those that are projected to worsen pose 
a threat to the 40 percent of Americans who live in coastal communities and the $8.3 trillion in 
2 ​For the purposes of this thesis, the two terms will be used interchangeably. 
3 ​Limitations include: studies of coastal areas not including hurricane risk; the difficulty of measuring the 
cost of “soft” adaptation measures; uncertainty of climate impacts; the possibility of changing timelines 
and costs often associated with public projects; the potential for poor construction or maintenance to lead 
to additional costs; changes in coastal development and/or population; and different cost estimates based 
on the timeline of implementation. 
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goods and services they produce annually, in addition to nearly half of the U.S. GDP (NOAA 
Office for Coastal Management, 2015; USGCRP, 2019). However, many cities and states have 
been unable to marshal the resources necessary for building resilience. In order to preemptively 
prepare for climate change at a scale commensurate with projected impacts, cities, regions, and 
states must look to the federal government to implement policy mechanisms that will catalyze 
investments in adaptation, incentivize risk reduction, and above all, keep America’s most 
vulnerable communities and economies safe from the impacts of climate change. 
In this thesis, I will analyze innovative policy solutions to this problem, using precedent, 
case studies, and new proposals, and make recommendations on the most effective way to build 
U.S. coastal resilience. 
  
Methodology 
 
In this thesis, I  have relied primarily on government documents, supplemented by 
interviews with leaders in the field of climate resilience. To assess state action on adaptation and 
resilience, I utilized climate projections to identify the states most vulnerable to coastal damages. 
I then relied on the Georgetown Climate Center’s State Adaptation Progress Tracker to identify 
relevant actions on the state level. To further assess state initiatives, I examined state adaptation 
and resilience plans, executive orders, legislation, and other relevant documents, which enabled 
me to identify best practices, gaps, and innovative policy ideas. I conducted an in-depth 
assessment of Louisiana’s coastal protection efforts due to the state’s high level of risk and 
preparedness compared to other states. This was accomplished primarily by using relevant 
agency documents and plans. This was supplemented through an interview with Charles 
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Sutcliffe, Louisiana’s Chief Resilience Officer for Coastal Activities, who provided information 
on the organizational structure, history, and background of the Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority. To analyze FEMA’s proposed Disaster Deductible, I relied primarily on 
the proposal published in the Federal Register and analyzed public comments from relevant 
organizations and officials. To supplement this work, I interviewed the Honorable Craig Fugate, 
the former FEMA Administrator under whom the policy was developed. Assessment of NFIP 
reforms was conducted by drawing from previous proposals and critiques by relevant parties. I 
analyzed the CBRA by examining the act itself and using Congressional Research Service 
documents. Tax credits were analyzed using past analyses of similar tax credits for energy 
efficiency. Finally, the assessment was conducted drawing from the iterative eightfold path 
method developed by Bardach and Patashnik (2016). 
This thesis then incorporates ideas of resilience as a systems-based framework with 
quantifiable outcomes, designed to build climate-resistant capacities. It will take the major 
barriers identified in past studies and attempt to discern, analyze, and assess potential solutions. 
It will differ from past works by focusing not on international development or urban resilience, 
but on federal measures, while taking examples from state initiatives. 
  
Literature Review 
 
 
The Origins of Resilience and Its Many Forms 
  
Climate resilience is a relatively new concept with ancient roots. Alexander (2013) traces 
the etymology of “resilience” to the Roman Empire, where it was used to mean “leaping” or 
“rebounding.” Resilience was made prominent in the environmental field by Holling (1973), who 
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adopted it as a measurable concept to describe ecosystems (Folke, 2006; Meerow, Newell, & 
Stults, 2016). Holling (1973) termed it as “a measure of the persistence of systems and of their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between 
populations or state variables.” The concept was applied primarily to ecology, where it gained 
widespread usage (Neubert & Caswell, 1997; Adger, 2000). Since then, the concept of resilience 
has migrated to other disciplines, including economics, psychology, political science, 
engineering, and geography (Pendall, Foster, & Crowell, 2010;  Bahadur, Ibrahim, & Tanner, 
2013; Matyas & Pelling, 2014).  
In the past 15 years, ideas of resilience have moved past Hollins’s use of it as a 
measurable concept and more towards “a way of thinking” (Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016). 
Although Timmerman (1981) was one of the first to link resilience and climate change, only in 
the past decade has the intersection of the two become mainstreamed (Alexander, 2013; 
Taşan-Kok, Stead, & Lu, 2013). Resilience has also moved from a descriptive concept to a 
systems-based approach (Walker and Salt, 2012; Haimes, 2009; Fiskel, 2017). Consequently, 
resilience has morphed from a quantifiable ecological concept, to a systems-based framework, to 
a compound of both. As governments, companies, and communities prepare for the impacts of 
climate change, measuring their resilience has become more important, albeit more difficult 
(Doherty, Klima, & Hellmann, 2016; Quinlan, Berbés-Blázquez, Haider, & Peterson, 2015; 
Schipper & Langston, 2015; Bahadur, Lovell, Wilkinson, & Tanner, 2015; Winderl, 2014; 
Mayunga, 2007; Summers, Harwell, Smith, & Buck, 2018).  
The importance of measuring the costs and benefits of resilient infrastructure has also 
increased, with Yohe, Neumann, Marshall, & Ameden (1996) and Fankhauser (1995) providing 
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the foundational studies on the matter. Mendelsohn (2000) established the concept of “efficient 
adaptation” to guide resilience and adaptation policy through a behavioral lens. However, there 
is still scholarly disagreement on the exact definition of resilience (Aldunce, Beilin, Handmer, & 
Howden, 2014). Campanella (2008) describes it as “the capacity of a city to rebound from 
destruction,” while many government entities define it as the ability to bounce back to “normal” 
conditions (Davoudi et al., 2012). This definition has been critiqued, however, due to the 
potential undesirability of past normalcy, for example in pre- and post-Katrina New Orleans 
(Pendall, Foster, and Cowell, 2010). Despite this definitional and operational ambiguity, 
resilience has become an important guiding concept in efforts to combat climate change. As 
Mitchell (2013) said, “everyone is talking about resilience.” 
  
Research on Barriers and Incentives for Resilience 
The subject of barriers and incentives for climate resilience is, like the broader concept, 
relatively new. There are limited academic studies on the topic which are augmented by a 
handful of government (both international and national/subnational) and non-governmental 
publications. The literature on barriers and incentives can be broadly split into two categories: 
international finance and development, and urban resilience. 
Bouwer and Aerts (2006) presented an early study on the challenges of financing 
resilience at an international scale, with proposals to ameliorate the problem through both the 
UNFCCC and generalized international development efforts. Other scholars continued in this 
vein, studying how international financing, primarily through the UN, could be applied to 
adaptation in developing countries (Fenton, Gallagher, Wright, Huq, & Nyandiga, 2014; Ayers 
and Huq, 2009; Mitchell, van Aalst, & Villanueva, 2010). Burton (2009) described the 
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“adaptation deficit,” or the idea that resilience and adaptation measures have not increased with 
or been mainstreamed into international development, contributing to less economically 
developed nations having less adaptive measures. Barriers and strategies for increasing resilience 
in specific less economically developed countries, primarily island nations in Asia, have also 
been a focus (Am, Cuccillato, Nkem, & Chevillard, 2013; Ayers, Huq, Wright, Faisal, & 
Hussain, 2013; Pervin, 2013; Ayers, Kaur, & Anderson, 2011). 
Adaptation and resilience specific to urban settings has been a primary research area 
(Tyler & Moench, 2012; Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Satterthwaite, 2013; Jha, Miner, & 
Stanton-Geddes, 2013; Surjan, Sharma, & Shaw, 2011; Hughes, 2015). Some authors have 
worked at the intersection of international development and urban resilience, focusing on how 
the former can specifically help urban areas build resilience (Bulkeley & Tuts, 2013; Baker, 
2012). Giordano (2012) wrote one of the few non-spatially-based pieces, focusing instead on the 
importance of incorporating climate resilience into the infrastructure planning process: he 
concluded that governments are crucial to implementing adaptive, climate-aware planning 
processes into the design of long-lived infrastructure. Brugmann (2012) focused specifically on 
strategies to upscale financing for adaptation in cities. Cheong (2010) completed one of the few 
studies focused on specific solutions, writing about relocation, zoning, insurance, and subsidies, 
and finding that a “strong state” would likely increase the effectiveness of such measures. 
Some of the literature on barriers to resilience has been conceptual or framework-oriented 
(Adger et. al, 2009; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Others have been more empirical, such as 
Bierbaum et. al (2013), who found that “few [adaptation] measures have been implemented [in 
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the U.S.] and even fewer have been evaluated...the most significant barriers include lack of 
funding, policy and institutional constraints, and difficulty in anticipating climate change…”  
Funding has been identified as a significant barrier to resilience and adaptation in 
multiple studies (Brunner & Nordgren, 2012; Carmin, Nadkarni, & Rhie, 2012; Garfin, Jardine, 
Merideth, Black, & LeRoy, 2011; Lackstrom et. al, 2012; Shi et. al, 2016; McIntosh & Cone, 
2014; Nordgren, Stults, & Meerow, 2016; Ekstrom & Moser, 2014). Wheeler (2008) found that 
most local climate action plans do not identify both specific funding needs or potential funding 
sources. Furthermore, the study found that local governments have often been unwilling to use 
their own budgets to fund climate change programs. This observation built on findings from 
Bailey (2007), who noted that cities were not investing their own funds in greenhouse gas 
reduction programs. Aylett (2014) found that U.S. cities have the lowest rate of engagement with 
adaptation policy relative to other nations. Similarly, fewer than 1 percent of U.S. cities have 
begun to plan for climate adaptation (Hansen, Gregg, Arroyo, Ellsworth, Jackson, & Snover, 
2013). Yet, Bierbaum et al. (2013) also found that U.S. local governments have engaged in 
adaptation to a greater extent than state or federal governments. Morsch and Bartlett (2011) 
provided an overview of the few state strategies for climate adaptation. 
 
 
Existing Federal Funding Sources 
  
There are a number of extant federal funding sources for projects focused on climate 
resilience, most of which are in the form of grant programs. However, it is difficult to 
comprehensively provide an overview of existing programs: a Government Accountability 
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Office (GAO) report found that federal climate programs are fragmented, often serve multiple 
purposes, and are not reported on in great detail by the Office of Management and Budget (GAO, 
2018). Nonetheless, estimated funding levels can be roughly estimated and prevailing themes can 
be identified. This following analysis identifies a number of issues with current federal funding 
sources. First and foremost, there is simply not enough money available. Furthermore, FEMA 
grants, which make up a significant portion of resilience-related grants, have been plagued by a 
lack of transparency in the selection process (H.Rept 115-107, 2017; Interview with Charles 
Sutcliffe, November 6, 2019). Many funding sources cap disbursements at relatively small 
amounts. Others are restricted to specific geographic areas, often in response to specific 
disasters. Lastly, many grant programs are decided by congressional appropriations and fluctuate 
annually, leaving important coastal resilience funds dependent on political decision making. 
The following section will discuss the main sources of federal funding for resilience that 
can be applied to coastal communities. The primary target of some of the following programs is 
not resilience or adaptation, but they have been or may be applied for those uses. 
There are a number of relevant grant programs housed in DHS, exclusively within 
FEMA. FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) provides post-disaster assistance 
for communities to reduce future disaster damages. Funding is available for state, local, tribal, 
and territorial (SLTT) entities following a federally-declared disaster. FEMA provides funding 
up to 75 percent of project costs. However, the total amount of funding available is contingent on 
the projected dollar amount of federal assistance following a disaster declaration. HMGP funding 
for a project is capped at up to 15 percent of the first $2 billion of estimated disaster assistance, 
up to 10 percent for assistance between $2 billion and $10 billion, and up to 7.5 percent for 
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assistance between $10 billion and $35.333 billion (FEMA, 2019h). In Fiscal Year 2018 (FY18), 
slightly more than $826 million in grants were given out through the HMGP (DHS, 2019). 
However, estimated project funding for FY19 has decreased sharply to $601 million (U.S. 
System for Award Management, 2019). HMGP funds are appropriated by Congress during the 
budgeting process. 
FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Program provides grants to SLTT entities in 
order to implement projects that reduce the cost and damage of future disasters. In FY19, PDM 
has a total funding pool of $250 million, with $20 million allotted to tribal applicants (FEMA, 
2019b). This is a notable increase from FY15, when PDM was appropriated only $25 million 
(FEMA, 2019a). However, funds are limited based on project type. The two most relevant 
project types, Hazard Mitigation and Resilient Infrastructure, are capped at $4 million and $10 
million per project, respectively (FEMA, 2019c). PDM can only fund up to 75 percent of a 
project’s costs (FEMA, 2019c). PDM funds, like the HMGP, are appropriated by Congress. 
FEMA’s Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program is specifically for projects that will 
reduce future damages to structures covered by the NFIP (FEMA, 2019d). Funding may also be 
used to devise flood mitigation plans. Individual homeowners are able to apply for funding, 
provided they are sponsored by a SLTT entity. In FY19, FMA has been appropriated $160 
million, with a maximum of $10 million available for community flood mitigation projects 
(FEMA, 2019d). FMA will generally fund only up to 75 percent of a project. (FEMA, 2019d). 
FMA funding has decreased slightly since FY16, when it was appropriated nearly $200 million 
(FEMA, 2016). FMA funding is appropriated by Congress. 
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FEMA’s Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program is new as of 
2019 and is still in the implementation stage. Although few details of the new program have been 
made publicly available, BRIC will provide grants to SLTT entities for hazard mitigation and 
large-scale resilient infrastructure projects (Fox, 2019). BRIC will differ from FEMA’s other 
grant programs in that funding will be derived from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF 
has been used primarily to respond to and rebuild after disasters, not to build resilience. FEMA 
recently announced that BRIC grants will be funded by a 6 percent set-aside from the estimated 
cost of disaster recovery for the specific disaster to which a grantee is responding. FEMA has 
indicated that this will come at the expense of PDM and DRF funding (DHS, 2019). 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s Community Development 
Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) Program is available to states, counties, and cities 
following a federal disaster declaration, and provides funding for unmet needs relating to disaster 
relief, long-term recovery, revitalization, and restoration. Since the program began in 1992, it has 
provided nearly $90 billion in grants (HUD, 2019a). CDBG-DR does not have annually 
appropriated funds: it is funded by congressional appropriations in response to a specific event(s) 
(HUD, 2019b). Adaptation or resilience projects must be part of the rebuilding process in order 
to be eligible for CDBG-DR funding (HUD, 2019b). 
Following Superstorm Sandy in 2013, HUD launched the Rebuild by Design competition 
along with philanthropic, academic, and non-profit partners. Funding was intended to spur 
innovative projects that would build resilience and could be scaled up regionally. The 
competition awarded $930 million in funding, which was derived from CDBG-DR funds 
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specifically appropriated to communities impacted by Sandy (HUD, 2019c). It is not clear if 
Rebuild by Design will have another application round or apply to states not affected by Sandy.  
Similarly to Rebuild by Design, HUD’s National Disaster Resilience Competition draws funding 
from CDBG-DR. Funding was applicable for states, counties, and cities that had experienced 
major disasters in 2011, 2012, or 2013. A total of 13 projects have been funded, totaling nearly 
$1 billion (HUD, 2019d). It is not clear if future funding opportunities will be available. 
In the Department of Commerce, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency 
(NOAA) and National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) jointly administer the National 
Coastal Resilience Fund, which was launched in 2018 as a public-private partnership between 
NOAA, the NFWF, Shell Oil Company, and TransRe (NFWF, 2018). It awarded nearly $29 
million in grants to 35 projects its inaugural year. The fund applies to projects which build 
resilience in coastal communities, improve water quality in coastal communities, or enhance 
coastal ecosystems (NFWF, 2019). 
Within the Department of the Interior, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
National Coastal Wetland Conservation Grant, which is provided to states in order to restore or 
enhance coastal wetlands and adjacent habitats. While this program does not specifically target 
resilience, projects that are awarded funding may, and often do, focus on resilience and 
adaptation. Funding is capped at $1 million per project (FWS, 2019a). In 2019, the program 
awarded slightly more than $20 million to 22 projects, five of which specifically mentioned 
resilience (FWS, 2019b). 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which is housed under the 
Department of Defense, administers the Continuing Authorities Program (CAP). CAP provides 
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assistance with feasibility studies and implementation of projects with water-based resilience 
benefits. The amount of funding provided for implementation is project-specific (USACE, 2019). 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) houses two relevant grant programs. The Build 
America Bureau and Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) program 
provides grants, loans, technical expertise, and credit for large-scale infrastructure projects 
(DOT, 2019a). These resources may be used for resilient infrastructure (Keenan, 2019). BUILD 
grants support road, rail, and port infrastructure with regional and/or national significance. In 
FY18, DOT awarded $1.5 billion in BUILD grants (DOT, 2019b). BUILD grants may be used to 
support adaptation and resilience goals, including retrofits and redundancy (Keenan, 2019). 
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Grants, the second relevant DOT program, 
provides grants to improve public transit systems. Grant awardees may use FTA funds to 
implement adaptive measures and increase the resilience of public transit systems (Keenan, 
2019). 
  
Summary 
This list may not be comprehensive: there are countless federal grant programs, many of 
which may be applied to projects concerning resilience and adaptation. However, the programs 
listed represent those recognized by scholars and policymakers to be the largest and most 
frequent sources of funding which may be applied to coastal resilience. It is difficult to 
accurately quantify the sum of federal funding for adaptation from the above sources, especially 
given that the main purpose of some is not resilience, that not all have reported funding totals for 
the most recent fiscal year, and that some are relevant only to specific events. Nonetheless, the 
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funding levels reported show that the federal government is likely awarding upwards of $3 to $4 
billion, but fewer than $10 billion, to projects focused on adaptation and resilience in a given 
year. While this is a significant sum, it is not enough to support adequate levels of coastal 
adaptation and resilience. Furthermore, many of these grants have their own shortcomings. Some 
are tied to specific disasters, making them inaccessible to other communities that are nonetheless 
in need of funding for resilience. Many are contingent on congressional appropriations, causing 
funding levels to potentially fluctuate annually, and leaving coastal resilience hanging in the 
balance of politically-charged decision making. Many of these grant programs also cap funding 
at relatively low amounts. Impactful projects requiring large investments – from tens of millions 
to billions of dollars – would be hard pressed to find adequate funding sources from among these 
federal programs, many of which cap project funding below $10 million. Lastly, because grants 
for coastal resilience are fragmented among numerous agencies and departments, they require 
considerable time, effort, and expertise on the part localities to sift through and apply for them. 
Though these programs represent a start for making coastal communities more resilient against 
the impacts of climate change, there is neither enough funding available nor sufficient 
coordination to adequately adapt the U.S. coast.  
   
 
State Action on Climate Resilience: A Brief Overview 
  
In order to assess both adaptation needs and potential scalable solutions, a series of states 
were investigated. States were selected based on cumulative projected coastal damage. The data 
used calculated damage as change in damage from coastal storms as a percent of county-level 
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GDP. Of the states projected to have increases in damages, those with significant projected 
damages were: Texas, Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts (Hsiang et al., 2017).  In 4
order to assess the state of coastal adaptation and resilience funding in the most vulnerable states, 
the following section will provide a brief overview of actions, funding levels, and unique or 
innovative policies, if applicable, drawing primarily from the Georgetown Climate Center’s State 
Adaptation Progress Tracker. 
Louisiana was determined to be the state with both high risk and the highest level of 
coastal resilience action. For this reason, it was selected for an in-depth analysis of adaptation 
and resilience funding mechanisms and best practices, and was excluded from the following 
section. 
Texas has developed two coastal resilience master plans, one in 2017, and one in 2019 
(Adaptation Clearinghouse, 2019). The most recent one, which outlines 123 high-priority 
projects with a total cost of $5.3 billion, contains no mention of they are to be funded, though it 
does mention GOMESA as a potential source (GLO, 2019). A 2017 document from the Texas 
Legislative Budget Board presented three potential options: funds appropriated by the state 
legislature, amend dedicated revenue accounts to include coastal protection, and/or allocate a 
portion of the state hotel occupancy tax revenue collected in 18 coastal counties towards master 
plan projects (Legislative Budget Board, 2019). It is unclear both how much money any of these 
options would amount to and if any of these proposals have moved forward. Texas voters 
approved Proposition 8 in November 2019, which amended the state constitution to create an 
4 The study excluded Alaska. 
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$800 million flood infrastructure fund (Samuels, 2019). It is unclear whether the new fund may 
be used towards the coastal resilience master plan. Texas is making progress, but is clearly still 
in the early stages of its coastal protection build up. 
Florida’s adaptation and resilience planning is extremely limited, despite its high level of 
risk. The state released the Energy and Climate Action Plan in 2008 as, among other things, a 
framework from which to build future resilience efforts. There has yet to be any follow-up plan, 
in large part due to political opposition. In 2011, the Florida legislature passed a bill which 
abolished the Florida Energy and Climate Committee, which had authored the report. There has 
been no statewide adaptation or resilience effort since 2008, and most related activities are 
accomplished on the local level exclusively (Georgetown Climate Center, 2018). However, 
Governor DeSantis hired the state’s first ever Chief Resilience Officer in August, 2019 (Florida 
Governor’s Office, 2019). 
Like Florida, South Carolina has significant vulnerabilities yet has taken little action. The 
Department of Health and Environmental Control published “Adapting to Shoreline Change: A 
Foundation for Improved Management and Planning in South Carolina,” in 2010 (South Carolina 
Department of Health and Environmental Control, 2010). The document dealt primarily with 
ecological shoreline changes, but did address risk to beachfront communities. Though no specific 
projects were proposed, a number of policies were suggested. These proposals included 
preventing the seaward expansion of beachfront development, eliminating subsidies in hazardous 
areas, and the strategic acquisition of beachfront property. However, there appears to be no 
follow-up document or indication as to whether they were adopted or not. Though South 
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Carolina has taken initial steps towards becoming more resilient, it has yet to identify specific 
projects or the funding sources that would be needed to implement them. 
North Carolina does not have a statewide adaptation or resilience plan. In 2012, the state 
convened a group of eleven state and federal agencies, including USACE but somewhat 
strangely excluding FEMA, to produce a framework for building resilience (North Carolina 
Interagency Leadership Team, 2012). The framework proposed broad goals rather than specific 
projects, and identified no potential funding sources. Progress since then has been nonexistent. 
However, Governor Roy Cooper signed Executive Order 80 in 2018, creating the North Carolina 
Climate Change Interagency Council and requiring them to produce a risk assessment and 
resilience plan by 2020 (Adaptation Clearinghouse, 2019b). Though it remains to be seen how 
recommended projects will be funded, North Carolina appears to be on the right track. 
Virginia has taken a number of steps to elevate the issue of coastal resilience. In 2016, 
legislation to create a revolving loan fund for shoreline resilience was passed. The fund assists 
localities that experienced recurring floods. While advocates have called for $50 million to be 
appropriated towards the fund, it has yet to be funded (Lightbody, 2019). In 2018, S. 265 was 
passed, which created an executive branch position of Special Assistant to the Governor for 
Coastal Adaptation and Protection (Adaptation Clearinghouse, 2019c). That same year, 
Governor Ralph Northam signed Executive Order (E.O.) 24, which named the Secretary of 
Natural Resources as the state’s Chief Resilience Officer and directed them to create a coastal 
resilience master plan. The E.O. specified that the plan should include a detailed funding analysis 
and recommendations for potential funding sources (E.O. 24, 2018). In November 2019, 
Governor Northam signed E.O. 45, which establishes a Flood Risk Management Standard meant 
Horowitz 24 
to discourage building in high-risk areas and encourage building elevation and other retrofits, 
based on climate projects (Virginia Secretary of Natural Resources, 2019). Virginia is following 
in the steps of Louisiana, but how much funding they can secure remains to be seen. 
Maryland has released two adaptation plans, the most recent coming in 2011. Only one 
focused on coastal adaptation. Like many other states, it functioned more as a framework than a 
plan with specific projects and funding requirements. The state has also implemented “Coast 
Smart” building, siting, and design requirements (Georgetown Climate Center, 2018).  
In 2013, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed Executive Order 41 to establish the 
Cabinet Committee on Climate and Resiliency (CCoCAR). The Committee produced a 
framework which dealt mainly with state agencies and their related functions rather than the state 
or general public as a whole (CCoCAR, 2014). In 2013, the state released a plan pertaining to sea 
level rise adaptation. The plan laid out seven objectives, each with a number of 
sub-recommendations. Notably, Recommendation 7.1 suggests creating a panel of experts to 
assess funding options for adaptation (Sea Level Rise Advisory Committee, 2013). However, it 
does not appear that such a panel has been convened at this time. Like many other states in this 
compilation, Delaware has taken some steps towards becoming more resilient, but seems to have 
not yet funded large-scale adaptation efforts. 
New Jersey is one of the states most vulnerable to coastal climate impacts. In 2009, the 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection recommended that the state complete a 
climate adaptation plan (Georgetown Climate Center, 2018). In spite of these two facts, the state 
has yet to develop such a plan. There has been more action on the agency and local level. For 
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example, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey developed and adopted the Climate 
Resilience Design Guidelines to prepare agency infrastructure for future climate impacts (ibid.). 
New York has a substantial number of adaptation and resilience related activities, both 
predating and following Superstorm Sandy. In 2011, the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority produced a report on adaptation across the state, which detailed potential 
adaptive measures across eight sectors, including coastal areas. However, the report did not 
contain cost estimates, specific projects, or potential funding sources (NYSERDA, 2011). 
Following Superstorm Sandy, Governor Andrew Cuomo created the 2100 Commission, which 
released a report on improving infrastructure resilience. Governor Cuomo also signed the 
Community Risk and Resilience Act in 2014, which mandated that state permitting and funding 
programs take climate change impacts into account (Georgetown Climate Center, 2018). New 
York has completed extensive research on best practices for increasing state resilience. However, 
it is unclear how much of these practices have been implemented. It appears that, although the 
state is prepared to build resilience, it has yet to do so on a large scale. 
Rhode Island began planning for resilience in 2010, when the state legislature created the 
Rhode Island Climate Change Commission. In 2014, Governor Lincoln Chafee established the 
Rhode Island Executive Climate Change Council by executive order. Both groups were charged 
with identifying adaptation strategies (Georgetown Climate Center, 2018). In 2017, Governor 
Gina Raimondo established a state Chief Resilience Officer through executive order.  In 2018, 
the state released the Resilient Rhody plan, which outlined a number of adaptation and resilience 
strategies and included a section on financing resilience. This section detailed barriers and 
potential funding options. Barriers included the limited available funding and complexity of 
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federal grants and lack of long-term revenue streams. Potential innovative funding options 
included various bond types, resilience zones where an additional tax is levied on resident to 
directly fund resilience initiatives, and a credit trading market (State of Rhode Island, 2018). 
Rhode Island clearly has an innovative vision on how to fund coastal resilience. Which methods 
they choose and how effective they are at mobilizing funds remains to be seen. 
In 2008, Connecticut’s Public Act 08-98 established an Adaptation Subcommittee within 
the already extant Governor’s Steering Committee on Climate Change (GSC) (Georgetown 
Climate Center, 2018). Following Tropical Storm Irene, Governor Dannel Malloy convened the 
Two Storm Panel to deliver recommendations on how to increase the state’s resilience (Two 
Storm Panel, 2012). In 2013, the Shoreline Preservation Task Force, which was created by the 
state legislature, produced a report detailing a number of recommendations to increase coastal 
resilience. There was no mention of funding sources throughout the document (Shoreline 
Preservation Task Force, 2013). Also in 2013, Connecticut released their statewide adaptation 
plan. Though it laid out a number of strategies, there were few mentions of specific funding 
streams (GSC, 2013). Though Connecticut has made significant strides towards identifying 
strategies to build resilience, it has yet to discuss or identify the necessary funding sources. 
In 2008, the Massachusetts legislature passed S.2540, which, among other things, 
established the Adaptation Advisory Committee under the purview of the Secretary of Energy 
and Environmental Affairs (Georgetown Climate Center, 2018). The Committee released an 
adaptation report in 2011 which included a subsection on coastal resilience. This section 
included recommendations related to building codes, zoning, voluntary land acquisition, and the 
incorporation of climate projections into public infrastructure projects. However, no specific 
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funding sources were considered (Adaptation Advisory Committee, 2011). The state released a 
second adaptation plan in 2018. For each goal, the plan presents a potential funding source. 
However, no amounts are delineated (Massachusetts Governor’s Office, 2018). Massachusetts 
also has a number of grant programs for resilience. In 2014, Governor Deval Patrick 
appropriated $10 million for coastal resilience infrastructure. In 2018, H.4835 passed, providing 
$501 million for coastal adaptation and resilience. Of this, $290 million was improvements and 
repairs to dams, seawalls, and other forms of coastal resilience infrastructure; $75 million was 
for local grants; and $100 million was for implementation of the most recent adaptation plan 
(Georgetown Climate Center, 2018). Massachusetts is one of the few states to have invested a 
significant sum of money in coastal resilience. 
  
Summary of Trends 
The survey of the states most vulnerable to coastal climate-induced damages reveals a 
number of trends. Five of the twelve states, North Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, New York, and 
Rhode Island, codified a form of action on resilience through executive orders. These actions 
were primarily confined to the establishment of committees, high-level positions, or reports. 
These may have been done through executive order due to opposition in the legislature. While 
these executive actions represent positive progress, their lack of codification leaves them 
vulnerable to repeal by future governors. 
 Another commonality is that many states have completed adaptation plans or 
frameworks, but have yet to translate them into specific projects, identify funding sources, or 
move towards implementation. This is true to varying extents for Texas, Florida, South Carolina, 
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North Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Even 
well-developed plans often have little if any mention of funding sources. This may indicate that 
states have thus far been unable to identify the necessary funding sources for implementation. It 
may also indicate that politicians and administrations have short-term planning and prioritization 
horizons, and have therefore been unable or unwilling to appropriate funds towards initiatives 
that will not have noticeable effects for years to come. 
 Some states have elevated the issue of resilience by appointing statewide chief resilience 
officers. Florida, Virginia, and Rhode Island have created such a position. Virginia has 
distinguished itself from the other two states by having an executive branch position on coastal 
resilience, in addition to having a chief resilience officer. Similarly, many states have recognized 
the importance of focusing on coastal resilience specifically by convening task forces, 
committees, and by dedicating sections of reports to it. It is clear, however, that appointing a 
chief resilience officer is an emerging best practice (ecoRI, 2017). Creating a position or an 
authority specifically for coastal resilience may be an even more effective way to focus on 
America’s most at-risk areas. 
  
 
Deep Dive: Louisiana’s Coastal Protection Efforts 
  
Louisiana has had, at the time of this writing, an unparalleled history of significant 
natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina stands out for its severity: at least 1,800 people died, 1.3 
million were forced to evacuate, and New Orleans has yet to fully recover (Lopez, 2015). Yet, 
natural disasters have long been endemic to Louisiana. This history of storms, land loss, and 
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destruction is more extreme than is the case in most other states. It has made Louisiana acutely 
aware of the challenges it faces and the actions it must take to become more resilient. Due to this 
longstanding history of natural disasters, Louisiana has been a leader in funding and 
organizational initiatives relating to climate adaptation and resilience. It has also implemented 
unique and innovative resilience policies, particularly since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
  
Louisiana’s Risk Profile: Current and Cumulative Impacts 
Louisiana faces some of the most dire consequences of coastal climate impacts. Since 
1932, the state has lost more than 1,900 square miles of coastline – an amount nearly equal to the 
state of Delaware – due in large part to SLR, storm surges, and hurricanes (LA OCD, 2019). Of 
those roughly 1,900 square miles lost, 300 square miles disappeared between 2004 and 2008 
solely because of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike (CPRA, 2017). The destruction of 
barrier islands has further exacerbated land loss, as the storm surge attenuation they provided is 
no longer present in many areas (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018). Louisiana is the most 
flood-prone state in the U.S, and every single parish in the state has been included in a federal 
disaster declaration since 2005 (LA OCD, 2019). Current annual flooding damages along the 
coast are roughly $2.4 billion (CPRA, 2017). 
 
Louisiana’s Risk Profile: Future Projections and Implications 
Though Louisiana’s coast has already felt many impacts from climate change, future 
projections are even more foreboding. Relative SLR is projected to range between two and six 
feet in coastal Louisiana by 2067, depending on local geography (LA OCD, 2019). As sea levels 
rise, flooding will become deeper and more frequent, causing current protective measures to fail, 
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some sooner than later. The Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS), a 
series of levees, pumps, and other protective measures built in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
at a cost of $14 billion, will no longer provide adequate protection against 100-year storm events 
by 2023, due in large part to SLR (USACE, 2019). Without adequate action, ​annual​ damages 
from flooding alone could be as high as $21 billion by 2061 (RAND, 2012). Increased sea levels, 
along with coastal erosion exacerbated by barrier island loss, will cause the state to lose as much 
as 2,254 square miles of land in the next 50 years (LA OCD, 2019). This land loss will only 
further exacerbate coastal flooding. The intensity of storms impacting Louisiana could also 
increase by as much as 15 percent (LA OCD, 2019). 
Future climate impacts along the Louisiana coastline will harm both local communities 
and the entire U.S. Over two million people live along the Louisiana coastline, many of whom 
live in impoverished, majority-minority communities (CPRA, 2017b; Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2018). Should land loss continue without sufficient mitigation, the cost to relocate 
those most vulnerable to climate change will be upwards of $40 billion – much of which will be 
concentrated in Louisiana (CPRA, 2017b). Using a different SLR model than CPRA, one study 
found that 45,000 properties in Louisiana, which are currently home to 99,000 people and are 
worth $4.3 billion, will be chronically inundated by 2045. These properties currently supply $36 
million in property tax revenue annually (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018b). Coastal climate 
impacts will not only uproot thousands of people and harm local economies, but will also impact 
local government budgets. This may further inhibit the ability of localities to budget for climate 
adaptation. 
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Many pieces of nationally significant infrastructure are at risk as well. These include New 
Orleans International Airport, the New Orleans Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, and the 
Port of South Louisiana, which is the country’s largest port by tonnage (Brennan et al., 2008; LA 
OCD, 2019). Large offshore oil and natural gas operations and distribution infrastructure are also 
at risk: a three-week disruption in service to Port Fourchon, a hub for oil import and distribution, 
would cost the U.S. economy $3.1 billion in earnings and over 65,000 jobs (LA OCD, 2019). 
   
Agency Consolidation: The CPRA 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana had a number of agencies dedicated to coastal 
protection. However, this produced a situation in which efforts to address coastal issues were 
“inadequate, fragmented, [and] uncoordinated” (S.71, 2005). Following Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, the federal government conditioned funding for studies on hurricane protection measures 
on the establishment of a single state entity with oversight over flood and hurricane resilience 
projects (Public Law 109-148, 2005). Following this ultimatum, the Louisiana legislature created 
the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) as an entity within the Governor’s 
office. CPRA was given oversight of hurricane protection and coastal restoration projects 
through the combination of levee protection and wetland restoration departments, which had 
previously been separate (Interview with Charles Sutcliffe, November 6, 2019). CPRA was also 
given a mandate of creating a coastal master plan every five years. In 2009, the Louisiana 
legislature created the Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration (OCPR) as the 
implementation arm of CPRA. In 2012, the original CPRA was renamed the CPRA Board, and 
OCPR was renamed as the CPRA. Currently, the CPRA serves as the sole state entity which 
develops, implements, and enforces coastal protection projects, and coordinates with local, state, 
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and federal partners to do so (CPRA, 2019). The CPRA also has its own finance corporation, the 
CPR FC, but little information is publicly available on it. The CPR FC has the ability to issue 
bonds to finance projects, though it has yet to do so (EDF, 2018). 
  
Funding Louisiana’s Coastal Protection 
Revenue: Polluters Pay 
 CPRA generates a large amount of revenue from a number of different sources. In FY20, 
CPRA projects revenues of $813 million and expenditures of $747 million. Both revenues and 
expenditures are projected to increase over time, though the gap between the two will shrink. In 
FY22, CPRA projects revenues of $1.005 billion but expenditures of $1.047 billion: a $42.5 
million deficit (CPRA, 2019b). The projected increase in revenue is driven primarily by funds 
from the 2010 ​Deepwater Horizon ​settlement. 
The ​Deepwater Horizon​ funds come from three specific sources. One source is a Natural 
Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA), a legal process established by the 1990 Oil Pollution 
Act. An NRDA, which is most often completed by NOAA or the U.S. EPA, assesses the amount 
of damage caused and an appropriate settlement amount needed to restore damaged natural 
resources (Burlington, Meade, Baker, Brosnan, and Helm, 2010). In the case of ​Deepwater 
Horizon’s ​NRDA, BP will pay a total of $5 billion to Louisiana, disbursed in annual segments 
from 2017 to 2031, most of which will be appropriated towards coastal habitat restoration, 
conservation, and protection (Kline, 2017). NRDA funds available to CPRA will increase from 
$95 million in FY20 to $372 million in FY22 (CPRA, 2019b). 
The second source is the NFWF’s Gulf Environmental Benefit Fund (GEBF). The GEBF 
was established during the litigation process as part of BP’s settlement. BP and Transocean paid 
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a total of $2.54 billion to the GEBF, which will be used to support natural resource projects in 
affected states (NFWF, 2018). Louisiana was budgeted nearly $1.3 billion from the GEBF 
funding pool, which is distributed as grants to specific projects, exclusively ones related to 
barrier islands and river diversion (CPRA, 2017). CPRA expects $157 million from NFWF in 
FY20, but only $52 million by FY22 (CPRA, 2019b). 
The third ​Deepwater Horizon ​funding source is revenues from the Resources and 
Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast 
States Act (RESTORE Act). The RESTORE Act established a Gulf Coast Restoration Trust 
Fund where 80% of civil penalties paid under the Clean Water Act are deposited (USDT, 2019). 
The trust fund has roughly $5.36 billion, of which approximately $854.6 million has or will be 
sent to CPRA (Kline, 2017). Funds can be allocated towards resilience projects, ecosystem 
restoration, and spill cleanup. In FY20, CPRA expects $89 million from RESTORE funds; this is 
projected to rise significantly to $275 million in FY22 (CPRA, 2019b). 
 
Revenue: Other Major Sources 
 Although funds related to the ​Deepwater Horizon ​settlement make up over 40 percent of 
CPRA funding, there are several other significant funding sources. In FY20, the largest of these 
is funding derived from the state budget surplus. Surpluses from 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2018 
collectively contributed $138 million to CPRA revenues in FY20 (CPRA, 2019b). Budget 
surpluses may be allocated to CPRA or CPRA’s trust fund by the legislature or the governor. 
 The 2006 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act (GOMESA) provides another large 
revenue stream for CPRA. GOMESA distributes 37.5 percent of revenue collected by the federal 
government from oil and gas leasing activities in the Gulf of Mexico. This fund is then 
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distributed to Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, though since 2017, there has been a 
$500 million cap on revenue sharing (BOEM, 2019). Although GOMESA revenue ultimately 
depends on the oil and gas market, Louisiana is apportioned nearly half of annual GOMESA 
revenue, of which roughly 80 percent is given to CPRA (Kline, 2017). In FYs 20 through 22, 
CPRA projects GOMESA revenues of $70 million each year. CPRA also has funding from 
surplus GOMESA revenue: it appears that revenue exceeded projections in certain years, leading 
to unused funds which rolled over into the current FY. In FY20, carried-forward GOMESA 
revenue totaled $114 million (CPRA, 2019b). 
 A third major funding source is the Coastal Wetlands Planning Protection and 
Restoration Act (CWPPRA). CWPPRA was established in 1990 through the Breaux Act, and 
channels funding to CPRA from NOAA, USACE, EPA, FWS, and the USDA to pay for coastal 
restoration projects that will protect the Louisiana coast from storm surge and other flooding 
events. These agencies provide 85 percent of funds for specific projects, with state funding 
providing the remaining 15 percent (Restore the Mississippi River Delta, 2017). CWPPRA 
federal funds are derived from taxes on fishing and boating equipment. CWPPRA is only 
authorized through FY19, while funds will be available through FY21 (Kline, 2017). However, 
CPRA expects to receive CWPPRA funding through FY22. Over the next three years, CPRA 
projects between $62 and $68 million in CWPPRA funds annually (CPRA, 2019b). 
  
Analysis 
The creation of the CPRA had a large impact on Louisiana’s coastal resilience. Not only 
did it allow the state to receive federal funds, which would eventually result in the construction 
of the Hurricane & Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS), a series of levees, 
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floodwalls, gates, and pumps which protect New Orleans,  but it also elevated the issue of 
resilience while consolidating and dedicating resources for it. 
Louisiana’s coastal protection measures are forward thinking and well established. 
However, two problems stand out. One is the shortfall between necessary projects and projected 
revenues. The second is the sustainability of CPRA’s funding sources. Beginning in FY21, 
CPRA’s expenditures will outpace revenues (CPRA, 2019b). This trend is projected to continue 
into FY22. The main driver of this is not revenue stagnation: on the contrary, revenues will 
increase to over $1 billion in FY22 from $813 million in FY20. Instead, rising construction costs 
are the primary cause of expenditure increases. In FY20, construction will account for 65 
percent, or $486 million, of total CPRA expenditures. This rises to 81 percent, or $768 million, 
in FY22 (CPRA, 2019b). One reason for this may be that projects which are currently in the 
planning or design face may soon shift into construction. CPRA’s projections show that spending 
on planning and design is projected to decrease. A larger problem for CPRA and Louisiana may 
be the fact that a large sum of projected expenditures have not yet been funded. There are eight 
projects without funding sources in FY20, totaling $162 million. In FY22, this balloons to 16 
projects collectively projected to cost $644 million. In the scope of Louisiana’s larger, 50-year, 
$50 billion coastal master plan, which was prepared by CPRA, funding is similarly lacking. 
CPRA has identified between only $9 and $11 billion in funding sources for the project, or 
roughly one-fifth of what is needed (EDF, 2018). 
 What this long-term shortfall points to is a lack of sustainable funding sources. Though 
funding from ​Deepwater Horizon​ litigation is significant, it does not have the longevity required 
to fund long-term resilience. Funding from many ​Deepwater Horizon​-linked sources expires in 
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2031. After this date, CPRA must find additional funding sources to alleviate the loss of over 40 
percent of its revenues. CPRA’s reliance on GOMESA funding may also present an issue going 
forward. As climate action becomes more politically pertinent and actionable, fossil fuel 
revenues may decline naturally or due to regulation. Going forward, this could equate to 
significantly less funding available through GOMESA. Counting on revenue from budget 
surpluses and CWPPRA, which has yet to be reauthorized, may also prove to be untenable 
positions. While CPRA has grappled internally with questions on post-2031 funding sources and 
the implications of potential economy-wide decarbonization, they have yet to publicly present 
alternatives to either issue (Interview with Charles Sutcliffe, November 6, 2019). 
 One area in which the CPRA model excels is in its organizational structure. The CPRA 
chairman is a cabinet-level position within the Governor’s office (Office of the Governor, 2019). 
This placement has elevated the issue of coastal resilience and more acutely focused efforts to 
adapt the coastline against climate impacts (Interview with Charles Sutcliffe, November 6, 
2019). In addition, the state has a Chief Resilience Officer for Coastal Activities who also serves 
within the CPRA. CPRA itself has also driven the conversation around coastal resilience in 
Louisiana. Consolidating coastal resilience measures under one roof has allowed the CPRA to 
become the authority on the issue and to present a coherent, comprehensive, and singular 
message on resilience through interactions with the public and the media (Interview with Charles 
Sutcliffe, November 6, 2019). This was not and could not have been the case prior to CPRA’s 
advent, when resilience initiatives were fractured and spread amongst a number of different state 
agencies. The consolidation of coastal resilience under CPRA has also had financial benefits. 
When coastal resilience was diffused across different agencies, those agencies were forced to 
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compete against each other for funding opportunities. Prior to the CPRA, different state agencies 
were applying to the same federal grants, reducing the overall amount of funding for coastal 
resilience in the state (Interview with Charles Sutcliffe, November 6, 2019). The integration of 
different coastal resilience programs has eliminated this competition, allowing federal funds to 
be funneled and consolidated, and enabling CPRA to fund higher-cost resilience projects. Lastly, 
CPRA’s science-based approach and multiple funding sources have made the agency itself 
resilient. It has avoided political partisanship by basing project funding on transparent, science- 
and model-based estimates. It has also persisted through multiple gubernatorial administrations, 
including those of both major parties (Interview with Charles Sutcliffe, November 6, 2019). Its 
reliance on multiple funding sources, rather than just the state budget, has and will allow it to 
persist in the face of opposition, political or otherwise, and state budget shortfalls. 
  
What Makes Louisiana Different? A Comparison to Other At-Risk States  
As has been shown through the previous evaluations, Louisiana is ahead of other states 
by a number of metrics when it comes to coastal adaptation and resilience. Louisiana has 
appropriated significantly more resources towards coastal resilience. The CPRA has also been 
transparent about their funding sources and decision-making processes. Public documents show 
how the CPRA decides which projects to invest in. The authority also bases funding decisions 
exclusively on climate science, enabling them to maximize benefits and reducing the potential 
for politically-motivated appropriations. Though there are issues with CPRA’s funding sources 
as discussed previously, the authority nonetheless has significant recurring revenue streams 
which enable them to fund a number of high-impact, long-term projects. This differs from most 
states: only Massachusetts has made investments of a similar magnitude. While it is difficult to 
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assess state resilience funding sources due to lack of transparency, it appears that Louisiana is the 
only one with specific revenue streams dedicated to resilience. Louisiana joins three states, 
Florida, Virginia, and Rhode Island, in having a chief resilience officer. Only Louisiana and 
Virginia have positions focused specifically on coastal resilience. 
 Louisiana is a leader on the issue of climate resilience for a number of potential reasons. 
These have to do with experience and history, demographics, and access to revenue sources. 
The coastal demographics of the state also differ from many others. Those who have been most 
impacted by past storm events, including Hurricane Katrina, have predominantly been minorities 
and low-income populations (Curtis and Schneider, 2011). Many of the communities that still 
dot the coast come from similar demographics. The Louisiana coast is home to large 
communities of Asian, Black, and indigenous people, many of whom are both low-income and 
rely on the coastal waters for their sustenance and economies (Colten et al., 2018). This differs 
greatly from many other states where the coasts are populated by, if not a majority, a plurality of 
higher-income populations (Curtis and Schneider, 2011). For this reason, Louisiana coastal 
communities are ill-equipped, by virtue of having fewer financial resources and coming from 
historically underserved populations, to adapt to climate change. This may have exacerbated the 
need for the state to create an apparatus to do just that. 
 Louisiana also has access to financial resources which other states do not. ​Deepwater 
Horizon​ settlement funds and GOMESA revenues, for example, are only available to a select few 
states. The hundreds of millions of dollars they provide for Louisiana’s coastal resilience are not 
available to other states. 
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Recommendation 
 Climate change resilience is too cross-cutting of an issue to have actions related to it be 
coordinated by an extant agency. This challenge has already been recognized by at least one 
candidate for President in 2020 (Tom Steyer, 2019). Creating a new agency and position on 
climate change resilience would elevate the issue and reduce fragmentation of resilience efforts. 
Taking from Louisiana’s model, the President should seek Congressional approval to 
create a new agency dedicated to resilience under DHS, due to the Department’s mission of 
public security and disaster mitigation. The new agency should have an office dedicated 
specifically to coastal resilience. The agency should consolidate existing federal offices, bureaus, 
and funding sources related to resilience, including FEMA’s relevant grant programs. 
The administrator of the agency would function as a nationwide chief resilience officer. The 
President could, if plausible, seek Presidential reorganization authority to create such an agency 
independent of Congress. 
Following the lead of Louisiana, Florida, Virginia, and Rhode Island, the President 
should create a nationwide position on resilience. This will similarly elevate the importance of 
adaptation and resilience and allow efforts to be coordinated and mainstreamed. Creating an 
office dedicated to coastal resilience will have similar effects as the position on resilience, but 
targeted specifically at the most areas in the country most vulnerable to SLR, hurricane damages, 
erosion, and other coastal impacts. This office could consolidate many of the disparate funding 
sources already available for coastal resilience, allowing for high-impact, high-cost projects to be 
funded. The agency could also benefit from further Congressional appropriations.  
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The President may wish to adopt Louisiana’s “polluter pays” method of funding coastal 
resilience, and direct the Department of Justice to join existing state lawsuits or launch new cases 
against corporations deemed liable or negligible in their actions, as it relates to climate change. 
This could significantly increase the amount of funding available for coastal resilience. The 
agency should adopt the CPRA’s methods of project selection by using the latest climate 
projections to inform project-specific appropriations. The agency should consider creating grant 
programs using set-asides, as in FEMA’s BRIC program, in order to insulate funds from 
Congressional action. 
  
  
Policy Alternative: FEMA’s Disaster Deductible 
  
 
Disaster Deductible Background 
 In 2016, FEMA published a proposed rule on a disaster deductible concept. It would 
effectively condition disaster aid on pre-disaster levels of resilience. It would specifically apply 
to Public Assistance (PA) funds. The PA program provides funding for emergency work, repairs, 
and related management costs in states and localities in which a presidential disaster declaration 
has been issued (Brown and Richardson, 2015). The PA program is funded from Disaster Relief 
Fund DRF appropriations and made up approximately 47 percent of DRF expenditures between 
FY2000 and FY2013, which equates to $52.6 billion in grants (ibid.). Between FY2005 and 
FY2013, 65 percent of PA grants were for permanent work, meaning repairs, reconstruction, and 
replacement (Federal Register, 2017). 
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 The concept of the disaster deductible was driven primarily by budgetary concerns. These 
concerns can be separated into three categories: 1) the increasing frequency and damages caused 
by disasters, 2) the drawbacks of FEMA’s per capita indicator, and 3) the 2013 budget 
sequestration. 
 As has been addressed previously, natural hazards are occurring more frequently and 
with greater intensity due to the influence of climate change. This has caused a strain on 
FEMA’s disaster relief budget. When the cost of response and recovery exceeds the amount 
available in the DRF, which happens nearly every year, Congress is forced to issue supplemental 
appropriations. Since 2004, Congress has approved $89.6 billion in supplemental appropriations 
for the DRF (Lindsay, 2014). This is neither sustainable nor ideal due to the litany of issues that 
supplemental appropriations present. Supplemental appropriations can exceed spending limits, 
therefore enticing lawmakers to underfund the DRF during the appropriations process. They are 
often rushed through Congress, resulting in funding being based on potentially less accurate cost 
estimates due to lack of time to assess damages. Lastly, irrelevant riders may be attached to 
supplemental appropriations, slowing down the process and delaying much needed aid to 
affected communities (Lindsay, 2014). These budgetary shortfalls had also been noted by both 
the DHS Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office (Interview with Craig 
Fugate, November 7, 2019). 
 FEMA’s per capita indicator has also increased agency expenditures. Following a 
disaster, FEMA makes a recommendation to the President on whether to provide federal 
assistance or not. A primary factor in this recommendation is the per capita indicator. The 
indicator, which came into usage in 1986, assesses the financial capacity of a state to respond to 
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a disaster. The initial per capita threshold was $1, with a minimum of $1 million (§206.48, 
1999). The per capita indicator remained $1 from 1986 until 1999, when FEMA began to take 
inflation into account. However, inflation was not added retroactively. This means that the per 
capita indicator lags behind what its value should be. Since 1986, per capita personal income, 
upon which the indicator is based, has risen over 300 percent. The per capita indicator, however, 
has only risen 31 percent during the same time span. This has resulted in a number of disasters 
being declared which otherwise would not have been declared. If the per capita indicator had 
kept pace with income increases, 70 percent of the disasters between 2005 to 2014 would not 
have been declared, resulting in $5 billion saved by the federal government. 
 The final driver behind the deductible was the 2013 budget sequestration (Interview with 
Craig Fugate, November 7, 2019). The government shutdown necessitated budget cuts across 
most government agencies and functions, FEMA included. In response to these cuts, FEMA was 
forced to take stock of how and when they provided disaster relief. FEMA staff were asked to 
look at what the agency was obligated to do, and how it would operate differently with a clean 
slate (Interview with Craig Fugate, November 7, 2019). These internal discussions led to the 
creation of the deductible concept. 
 These three fiscal issues, increasing disaster costs, unnecessary spending, and required 
budget cuts, pushed FEMA staff to investigate innovative policy proposals which would ease the 
burden of disaster assistance on the federal government. Their recommendation – the disaster 
deductible – would decrease federal spending while incentivizing local-level resilience. 
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Disaster Deductible Explained 
The purpose of the deductible is to reduce federal spending on disaster relief and state reliance 
on the federal government while encouraging states to take proactive measures to guard against 
disaster-related damages. Under the deductible model, a state would only receive non-emergency 
PA funding after spending a certain, predetermined amount of money on adaptation, resilience, 
and response. This predetermined amount, or deductible, is calculated by FEMA and is based off 
of a state’s fiscal capacity and disaster risk. The deductible could be lowered through a series of 
credits designed to incentivize state spending on resilience-related best practices. 
 
Deductible Methodology 
Fiscal capacity was determined through a number of indicators, including​ ​per capita Total 
Taxable Resources, per capita surplus and deficit, per capita reserve funding, and the state's bond 
rating. To calculate a state’s risk level FEMA used Average Annualized Losses (AAL), which is 
calculated using the likelihood of a hazard occurring in a given year and the likely cost of the 
hazard if it happens. AAL data was collected from FEMA’s Hazus tool, and was then converted 
into a composite risk index. Fiscal capacity was multiplied by 0.25 and the risk factor was 
multiplied by 0.75 to produce a state’s base deductible. 
  
Deductible Credit 
To offset deductible costs and further incentivize states to invest in resilience and other 
disaster-related best practices, FEMA has proposed a credit system. There are 7 proposed 
categories of credit. 
1. Dedicated Funding for Emergency Response/Recovery Activities 
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 FEMA wants states to be fiscally prepared for disaster to strike. Rather than having to 
divert resources, quickly raise funds, or take other measures which may harm unrelated programs 
and slow recovery time, states should have a dedicated fund for disaster response and recovery. 
For every $1 a state appropriates for this use, $1 in credit is earned. This credit can account for 
up to 20 percent of a state’s deductible. 
2. Expenditures for Non-Stafford Act Response and Recovery Activities 
Broadly, the Stafford Act dictates how the federal government responds to disasters. For 
a state or locality to receive federal disaster aid, there must be a presidential disaster declaration. 
However, this declaration may not cover communities that, while affected to a lesser extent than 
those which bore the brunt of the disaster, were still impacted by the disaster in some way. 
Damages can often exceed local capabilities while still falling short of the criteria for federal aid, 
necessitating state assistance. Therefore, this credit incentivizes states to continue providing and 
to increase aid to localities impacted. For every $1 in state spending on response or recovery 
from an incident not included in a federal disaster declaration, $1 in credit is earned. This credit 
may account for up to 20 percent of a state’s deductible. 
3. Expenditures for Mitigation Activities 
 In order to incentivize specific resilient practices, FEMA proposed a credit for 
pre-disaster mitigation actions. This credit is based on expenditures for non-federally funded 
projects or projects in which a state exceeds minimum cost sharing thresholds for federal 
funding. Eligible projects are defined under FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance Guidance, 
and include property acquisition and demolition/relocation, structural elevation, ignition-resistant 
construction, and soil stabilization. For every $1 spent on eligible mitigation activities, a state 
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would receive $3 in credit. Due to the importance of building resilience, FEMA would not cap 
this credit. 
4. Insurance Coverage for Public Facilities, Assets, and Infrastructure 
 Insurance coverage can be a crucial component of a state’s ability to bounce back from a 
disaster. In order to qualify for this credit, a state must have either self-insure or purchase a 
policy that provides guaranteed coverage for  natural hazards, fires, explosions, floods, or 
terrorist attacks. This credit has no cap, and would reduce the deductible by a percentage 
specified by the amount of coverage above the deductible amount. 
5. Building Code Effectiveness Grade Schedule (BCEGS) 
 Implementing building codes is an effective form of resilience. To incentivize this, 
FEMA devised a credit that recognizes strong building codes. BCEGS provides a rating system 
to assess the strength and effectiveness of building codes on a 1 (highest) to 10 (lowest) scale. A 
state’s BCEGS score is calculated by averaging the BCEGS score of every participating 
community within the state, each of which is evaluated every three to five years (Verisk, 2019). 
The credit would be applied on a graduated scale corresponding with the state’s BCEGS score. 
For instance, a score of 1 would qualify for a credit equal to 20 percent of the state’s deductible. 
Based on 2015 state BCEGS scores, the average state would qualify for a 16 percent reduction to 
their deductible. 
6. Tax Incentive Programs 
 This credit functions almost as a form of reimbursement for state tax incentives. For this 
credit, FEMA would allow states to count programs of their choosing, rather than prescribing 
specific types of incentives. However, the incentive program must be focused on preparedness, 
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mitigation, or resilience. An example of a qualifying program is offering income tax credits for 
elevating homes. This credit would not be capped, and a state would receive $2 for every $1 
expended on direct costs, such as advertising or administration, and foregone costs, such as lost 
tax revenue. 
7. Expenditures on State Emergency Management Programs 
 This credit seeks to push states to invest more of their own funds into emergency 
management programs, which the federal government has often funded. Specifications for 
program eligibility have not yet been promulgated. For every $1 invested by a state in emergency 
management programs, a $1 credit would be applied to the deductible, for up to 20 percent of the 
deductible. 
  
Responses to the Deductible 
 Upon initial publication of the proposed deductible in the Federal Register, the concept 
was met with mixed reactions. Support for the deductible emanated from a diverse faction of 
conservative think tanks, environmental groups, advocacy organizations, and even some states, 
who saw it as a better option than changing the per capita indicator (Interview with Craig Fugate, 
November 7, 2019). Current FEMA Administrator Pete Gaynor, who was the Director of the 
Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency at the time, offered support for the concept in a 
comment to the Federal Register (Gaynor, 2016). The deductible was supported by groups from 
the insurance industry, including Swiss Re, and the National Association of Mutual Insurance 
Companies. Groups who are at the forefront of the activities that would be counted for credits, 
like the Association of State Floodplain Managers, the Insurance Institute for Business and 
Home Safety, and the National Institute of Building Sciences, supported the concept. 
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Environmental advocacy organizations, including the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council,  The Nature Conservancy, and the Environmental Law Project. 
They were joined by the Heritage Foundation and the R Street Institute, both conservative think 
tanks who applauded FEMA’s efforts to reduce costs and the federal role in disaster relief. 
Though the proposal was made during the Obama administration, James Carafano, who lead 
President Trump’s transition team for DHS, voiced his support for the concept (Flavelle, 2017).  
Opposition to the deductible came primarily from those representing PA recipients and 
subrecipients (county and local government). The main criticisms voiced centered on the legality 
of the deductible and the impact it would have on state, county, and local abilities to respond to 
and recover from disasters. A number of governors and state agencies voiced their disapproval of 
the concept. The National Governors Association voiced opposition to the possibility of adding 
an additional financial burden to states (NGA, 2016). Similarly, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, National League of Cities, and U.S. Conference of Mayors presented concerns 
about the deductible’s inability to account for local level investments in resilience. They also 
questioned the legality of the proposal, which will be discussed below (NCSL et al., 2016). A 
number of elected officials also decried the proposal, believing it would put too much of a 
burden on states while limiting the effectiveness and timeliness of disaster response (Thompson, 
2016; Illinois Congressional Delegation, 2017). They also mentioned potential legal barriers. 
Finally, two organizations representing utilities, the American Public Power Association and the 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, also voiced concerns about the legality of the 
concept as well as the burden it would place on recipients and subrecipients (NRECA, 2016). 
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Noted Drawbacks 
 The Stafford Act requires the federal government to provide at least 75 percent of the 
cost for essential assistance, repairs, reconstruction, restoration, and replacement following a 
federally-declared disaster (Stafford Act, 1988). Increasing the amount of funding a state is 
responsible for would potentially decrease the federal share of funding in certain situations. In 
practice, this may violate the Stafford Act. This was noted by both proponents of the deductible, 
like the Heritage Foundation, and opponents. Although legal considerations must be studied 
further, Congress may have to amend the Stafford Act in order for the disaster deductible to be 
legal. 
One primary drawback of the proposal, regardless of its legality, is its sole focus on state 
actions. Only state government actions would count towards credits, despite the fact that many 
localities have been taking action to become more resilient, and are oftentimes better positioned 
to do so. Some of the activities that would count towards credits, such as instituting building 
codes, take place primarily at the local level. FEMA has not created a mechanism to take these 
local level activities into account. 
 A third concern about the deductible is the methodology used to calculate risk and fiscal 
capacity. A primary tool used to calculate risk was FEMA’s HAZUS program. HAZUS accounts 
for earthquake, hurricane, flood, and tsunami hazards (FEMA, 2019e). While this covers the 
hazards which pose the greatest risk to coastal communities, HAZUS does not model for 
wildfire, tornado, hail, and straight-line wind events (Swiss Re, 2017). The fiscal capacity 
calculation likewise has potential issues. Since lesser fiscal capacity theoretically lowers the 
deductible amount, poor handling of state finances could produce a beneficial result for a state. 
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This may perversely reward unsatisfactory financial decisions (Swiss Re, 2017). Lastly, it does 
not account for variations in local or county level fiscal capacities. This relates to the concerns 
voiced by many local actors that the deductible would not properly account for their 
credit-eligible actions and fiscal needs, as differed from the state as a whole. 
  
Recommendation 
 The proposed deductible, as is, does not do enough to incentivize resilience. FEMA 
should consider creating an additional credit that incentivizes states to create CPRA-like 
authorities. Louisiana has greatly improved their resilience through the advent of the CPRA: 
creating similar authorities in other states would likely both increase resilience and reduce 
federal disaster aid costs. 
Additionally, FEMA should continue to investigate and refine the disaster deductible. 
However, they must first examine the legality of the proposed deductible as it relates to the 
Stafford Act. If it is determined that the deductible runs afoul of the Stafford Act, FEMA should 
work with Congressional partners to amend the Act, though this may be unlikely due to past 
concerns from lawmakers. In the case of its legal or illegality, FEMA should nonetheless pursue 
refinements of the proposal. First, FEMA should investigate how local activities, such as 
building codes, can be incorporated into the deductible and its credit structure. Second, FEMA 
should consider replacing or supplementing HAZUS and their fiscal capacity method to create a 
more holistic risk assessment and a more incentivizing structure for state spending on resilience, 
respectively. 
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Policy Alternative: NFIP Reform and CBRA Expansion 
  
 
NFIP History and Basics 
 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a federal program administered by 
FEMA that provides flood insurance to homeowners. The NFIP was established by Congress in 
1968 in response to the lack of private insurers willing to insure homes in the floodplain and the 
increasing burden that disasters imposed on the federal government (Horn and Webel, 2019; 
Huber, 2012). The NFIP is a voluntary program that is available to communities, defined as 
states or any subdivision of a state, except those covered by the Coastal Barrier Resources Act 
(CBRA) (Huber, 2012). In return for NFIP coverage, communities agree to adopt minimum 
floodplain management standards, which includes limiting development in the Flood Hazard 
Areas (SFHAs) (Horn and Webel, 2019). Communities enrolled in the NFIP may decrease their 
premiums further by joining the Community Rating System (CRS). The CRS program ranks 
communities into classes ranked 10 (lowest) to 1 (highest) based on resilience, outreach, and 
management activities which exceed NFIP-mandated minimums (FEMA, 2017). Each class 
improvement results in a 5 percent discount on flood insurance premiums for policyholders 
within a community (ibid.).  
The NFIP is attractive to communities for a number of reasons. First, private insurers 
often deny coverage or only offer plans with extremely high premiums to communities with high 
flood risk or a history of recurring flood events. In contrast, NFIP has no mandate to create a 
profit, and can therefore keep premiums low (Huber, 2012). This allows homeowners to obtain 
insurance at reasonable rates. Enrolling in the NFIP also mandates that a community adhere to 
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minimum floodplain standards, which builds resilience. This benefits the federal government as 
well, because disaster recovery expenditures will theoretically decrease in response to increased 
resilience.  
The NFIP receives revenue from three sources: flood insurance premiums, Congressional 
appropriations, and the U.S. Treasury. As of November 2018, premiums accounted for $3.6 
billion in revenue; Congressional appropriations accounted for nearly $2 billion in FY19; and is 
loaned money by the Treasury on a case-by-case basis (Horn and Webel, 2019).  Since 2018, the 5
NFIP has attempted to increasingly transfer risk to the private sector while raising revenues 
through the issuing of catastrophe bonds. Through FEMA, the program’s first catastrophe bond 
was issued in August 2018 and transferred $500 million worth of risk. Since then, the agency has 
issued one more catastrophe bond, worth $300 million (Insurance Information Institute, 2019). 
Currently, the NFIP insures roughly 5.1 million homeowners and $1.3 trillion worth of assets 
(FEMA, 2019i). 
 
The CBRA Exception 
The only areas specifically disallowed from receiving NFIP coverage are those which fall 
under the CBRA. Areas covered by a CBRA designation are those which serve as natural 
barriers against coastal storms and hurricanes (FWS, 2019c). The CBRA prohibits federal 
expenditures of nearly every kind in the area with few exceptions (ibid.) The motivation for the 
CBRA was to remove incentives to develop in high-risk areas while minimizing federal disaster 
relief expenditures (Lipiec and Crafton, 2019). Congress must authorize the addition of new 
areas to the CBRA (FWS, 2019c). Though the CBRA is not able to disallow local government 
5 Congress has increased NFIP funding over time. 
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expenditures, private development, or private insurers from operating within a given area’s 
boundaries, it has nonetheless produced significant benefits due to a reduction of moral hazard. 
A 2002 study by the FWS, which oversees the act, found that the CBRA had produced $686 
million in savings between 1983 and 1996 due primarily to avoided disaster relief and 
infrastructure costs (Lipiec and Crafton, 2019). A 2019 study found the CBRA’s benefits to be 
even greater: the CBRA reduced federal disaster expenditures by $9.5 billion between 1989 and 
2013. The study projects that the CBRA will additionally save between $11 billion and $108 
billion by 2068 (Coburn and Whitehead, 2019). The large discrepancy in estimates is explained 
by the use of different scenarios based on varying development and damage rates (ibid.). 
  
Current Issues with the NFIP 
 While the number of policyholders has declined in recent years, the value of assets 
covered has increased (FEMA, 2019h). This suggests that wealthier policyholders, or at least 
policyholders with more valuable homes, are increasingly taking advantage of the NFIP’s 
low-cost premiums, an assertion which is backed up by a number of studies (Figure 2). Wealthier 
households tend to pay lesser premiums and 80 percent of NFIP-insured homes are located in 
counties that are in the top quintile of income (Brannon and Blask, 2017; Ben-Shahar and Logue, 
2016). 40 percent of NFIP-insured coastal properties are worth more than $500,000, 12 percent 
are worth more than $1 million, and 23 percent are not the policyholder’s primary residence 
(CBO, 2007). A major tenet of the program is to subsidize insurance for those who would 
otherwise be unable to afford it (Horn and Webel, 2019). Instead, the program is, to an extent, 
providing a lower-cost option to those who could presumably afford private insurance. This 
unnecessarily puts a greater strain on federal resources in the event of a flood. Furthermore, a 
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small percentage of NFIP-insured properties are responsible for a significant amount of claims. 
Repeatedly flooded properties make up 1 percent of covered properties but account for 25 to 30 
percent of all claims (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). These properties alone have cost the NFIP 
$12.5 billion (ibid.). 
 
Source: FEMA Statistics by Calendar Year, 2019. 
 
Another problem faced by the NFIP is its cost. Per its Congressional authorization, the 
NFIP is allowed to borrow no more than $30.425 billion from the Treasury over its lifetime 
(Horn and Webel, 2019). Following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, the NFIP 
reached its borrowing limit. In response, Congress cancelled $16 billion of the NFIP’s debt, the 
first time they had ever done so. Two weeks after the debt cancellation, the NFIP was forced to 
borrow another $6.1 billion, (ibid.). As of the third quarter of 2019, the NFIP has $9.9 billion in 
borrowing power remaining and $20.525 billion in outstanding debt (FEMA, 2019h). The NFIP 
loses roughly $1.4 billion each year (Dinan, 2017). As climate change induces greater disaster 
costs, NFIP claims will likely increase. This may force the NFIP to continue borrowing up to 
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their limit, putting Congress in a situation where they may have to cancel NFIP debt once again. 
This is neither a desirable nor sustainable strategy, and one which will only increase costs over 
time. 
Some believe that the minimum floodplain management standards mandated by entry 
into the program are not effective enough. While communities may adopt higher standards for 
premium reduction through the CRS, this is by no means a requirement. As of 2017, only 5 
percent of NFIP-participating communities had qualified for the CRS (FEMA, 2017b). The 
Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) has stated that “the minimum NFIP 
floodplain regulations do not provide adequate long-term flood risk reduction for communities,” 
(ASFPM, 2013). Given that risks will only increase with the progression of climate change, these 
inadequate standards will not effectively create resilient communities and will increase NFIP 
debt as claims rise. 
A final issue with the NFIP is that it perversely incentivizes development in high-risk 
areas due to incorrect pricing of risk. This moral hazard is due to the fact that NFIP premiums 
are not priced commensurately with risk, as evidenced by the NFIP’s large outstanding debt 
(Cato Institute, 2017). If the premiums were priced correctly, they would adequately cover NFIP 
claims. This is due to a number of reasons. One is that the flood maps FEMA uses to assess risk 
and calculate premiums are often outdated. A study by the DHS Investigator General revealed 
that 58 percent of these maps are outdated and considered inaccurate (Scata, 2017). For example, 
a property formerly considered outside of the highest-risk zones paid a premium of $429 a year. 
If updated maps with greater accuracy were to show that this property was now in a high-risk 
zone, the premium for the same amount of coverage would range between $5,000 to $10,000 per 
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year (Ben-Shahar and Logue, 2016). As climate change increases the reach of coastal flooding, 
this problem will only be exacerbated. A second issue is that the government does not currently 
take development, long-term erosion trends, or climate change into account when developing 
premium rates (Ben-Shahar and Logue, 2016). This has inadvertently incentivized development 
in high-risk flooding areas (Silvis, 2017; Ben-Shahar and Logue, 2016). This inherently puts 
more people, property, and assets at risk of coastal climate impacts. 
  
Potential Reforms 
 The Trump administration has proposed a number of reforms to the NFIP. These suite of 
reforms are collectively known as Risk Rating 2.0, and are anticipated to come into effect by 
2021. The new system was originally planned to be implemented in 2020. However, outcry from 
politicians, including a bipartisan group of 64 Congressmembers, concerned that policyholders 
would face significant increases in premiums, forced the new system to be delayed for further 
study (Warmbrodt, 2019). Risk Rating 2.0 will incorporate a larger range of potential flood 
events when calculating premiums and delineating at-risk areas: up to this point, the NFIP has 
only taken 100-year flooding events into account (FEMA, 2019c). The new rating will factor in 
the cost to rebuild an individual home, which officials have said will help the inequity of 
wealthier policyholders paying equal or lesser premiums than less wealthy policyholders. It will 
also take distance from the coast into account (Warmbrodt, 2019b). 
 Others have called for a strengthening of minimum floodplain standards. As discussed 
previously, the ASFPM outlined a number of standards that the NFIP could adopt. The Center 
for Climate and Energy Solutions proposed similar reforms of both the NFIP and CRS. They 
suggested adopting standards based on 500-year flood events and tying CRS incentives to 
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actions that are more correlated with risk reduction (Huber, 2012). In 2015, President Obama 
signed E.O. 13690, which mandated that federally-funded projects be built either two feet above 
the base flood elevation for 100-year flooding events or to the 500-year flood elevation (E.O. 
13690, 2015). As evidenced, both the government and nongovernmental organizations have 
identified building to 500-year flood standards as a best practice. 
  
Recommendation 
 The NFIP could be a powerful tool to increase resilience, but, in its current form, it fails 
to do so. In order to rectify this, FEMA should institute stronger mandatory minimum standards 
based on 500-year flood levels for the NFIP in order to increase the resilience of communities at 
risk of flood damage. Standards should be phased in over a number of years as determined by 
FEMA, the Water Resources Council, and the Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task 
Force, the latter two of which were responsible for implementation of E.O. 13690. NFIP 
policyholders who have not adopted the 500-year standards in the allotted time should be 
removed from the NFIP. In addition to increasing resilience, this proposal would also likely 
reduce NFIP expenditures by lessening the amount of claims due to the higher standards. This 
proposal could also potentially reduce premiums over time, as those who have adapted to or 
above 500-year standards will have their flood risk greatly reduced. 
In order to further incentivize adaptation and resilience in communities while keeping the 
NFIP solvent, premiums must accurately reflect risk. Therefore, FEMA should follow through 
with the implementation of Risk Rating 2.0, despite objections from lawmakers. 
Separately, FWS should conduct research relating to the expansion of CBRA. Specifically, FWS 
should seek to identify areas which will be at high risk of future coastal climate impacts and if 
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CBRA could be expanded to encompass or protect such areas. Expanding CBRA areas would 
create stretches of natural green infrastructure that would protect inland areas from climate 
change-induced damages. 
 
Policy Alternative: Resilience Tax Credits 
  
Tax Credits 
A potential policy prescription for increasing the resilience of coastal property is by 
providing incentives through tax credits. Such credits would not only encourage business- and 
homeowners to retrofit their buildings, but it would also help lower-income owners to make 
needed upgrades that may have been cost-prohibitive. There have been a number of proponents 
of this approach, including the Office of Management and Budget under the Obama 
administration and the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety (OMB, 2016; The 
Economic and Health Consequences of Climate Change, 2019). 
A resilience tax credit could be modeled after the Residential Energy Efficient Property 
Credit (ibid.). This nonrefundable credit counts for 30 percent of the cost for alternative energy 
equipment and its installation (IRS, 2017). Though the effectiveness of this specific credit is 
difficult to discern due to uncertainty about whether individuals would have made energy 
efficiency purchases in its absence, a regression analysis of an earlier, similar credit found that a 
10 percentage point increase in the federal credit was associated with a 24 percent increase in the 
probability of a household making an investment in energy efficiency (Crandall-Hollick and 
Sherlock, 2016; Hassett and Metcalf, 1995). It is plausible that a similarly structured resilience 
tax credit would also increase the number of households investing in retrofits. 
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One legislative option related to this has already been introduced. The Disaster Savings 
and Resilient Construction Act of 2018, versions of which have been introduced in multiple 
previous sessions, would establish a federal tax credit for resilience (H.R. 6841, 2018). The 
amount of credit provided by this proposed legislation would be 1 percent of the cost of the 
property, or $25,000 for businesses and $3,000 for residential property. However, the credit 
would be available only to rebuilding properties encompassed in a federally declared disaster. 
Resilience would be defined as meeting International Building Code standards from 2009 or 
later, or receiving IBHS FORTIFIED accreditation (ibid.). Neither of these standards deal with 
flood risk, likely due to the fact that building standards related to flood risk are governed by the 
NFIP. 
  
Recommendation 
 Tax credits for resilience may provide a strong incentive for homeowners to retrofit their 
properties and adapt to climate change. Past studies have shown that similar credits are effective 
at influencing consumer behavior. While the goals of the Disaster Savings and Resilient 
Construction Act of 2018 are commendable, it falls short of sufficiently building coastal 
resilience. In order to adequately prepare the coast and produce the most benefits, adaptation and 
resilience should be proactive rather than reactive. While post-disaster resilience may be an 
easier task, it is less effective, as losses will have already occurred. By restricting tax credits to 
areas within a federally-declared disaster zone, the Disaster Savings and Resilient Construction 
Act neglects areas that will become more vulnerable in the future due to climate change. Its use 
of IBHS FORTIFIED and International Building Code standards is also too restrictive to 
increase coastal resilience under current conditions. 
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An opportunity exists to use tax credits to help business- and homeowners, specifically 
low-income ones, conform to the new NFIP standards proposed in this thesis. This would 
alleviate financial strain and mitigate potential inequitable outcomes. Congress should create a 
tax credit, modeled on the Disaster Savings and Resilient Construction Act,  which will 
specifically help low-income NFIP policyholders comply with the proposed 500-year floodplain 
standards by providing credits for applicable retrofits. Such a tax credit would increase the 
resilience of communities at risk of severe flooding, and would provide necessary assistance to 
low-income business- and homeowners.  
  
Assessment 
 
  
In the following section, I will assess the proposal which creates a new agency dedicated 
to resilience, Office of Coastal Resilience, and administrator for resilience. This proposal was 
selected for assessment over others for the following reasons: the disaster deductible and NFIP 
reform have already faced considerable pushback from Congress; there is limited information 
available for making the well-rounded and quantitatively-backed assessment necessary for tax 
credits and CBRA expansion; and the assessed proposal is both unique and large-scale. 
I will assess the proposal according to a series of criteria: 1) Will the proposal quickly and 
effectively increase coastal resilience? 2) Will the proposal plausibly gain Congressional 
approval? 3) Will the proposal have long-term staying power? 4) Will the proposal have 
unintended negative or inequitable outcomes? 
  
Will the proposal quickly and effectively increase coastal resilience? 
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It is difficult to project outcomes for a less quantitatively-grounded policy proposal. 
Therefore, in order to assess its effectiveness, one must look to Louisiana and the CPRA. There 
are a number of ways in which its impact on coastal resilience must be examined: funding, 
project appropriation, and general elevation of the issue. 
 
Funding 
 As was previously noted, cost estimates for sufficient coastal adaptation are highly 
variable but incredibly costly nonetheless. Current federal appropriations for coastal adaptation 
and resilience spans somewhere between $4 and $10 billion per year (albeit with a number of 
conditions), yet needs are much greater, as discussed previously. It is difficult to say whether 
available funding would increase were this proposal to be implemented. This would be 
contingent on a number of factors. For one, it would depend on agency resistance to move 
current, disparate grant programs and offices related to coastal resilience under one umbrella in 
the new agency. Second, it would depend on how much Congress appropriates. 
History has shown that Congress often appropriates smaller, yet still significant sums to new 
agencies, and increases appropriations over time. This was the case with the two most 
environmentally-oriented agencies, the EPA and the Department of Energy (DOE). When the 
EPA was created in 1970, it was appropriated $1.4 billion, a number which has increased over 
time (EPA, 1990). The DOE, which consolidated a number of existing offices, had a budget of 
$10.4 billion in 1977, its inaugural year (DOE, 1994). This has since risen to over $30 billion 
(Horn and Webel, 2019). The newest federal department, the Department of Homeland Security, 
received $36.2 billion in FY 2004, its first full year of operation, and has since increased to over 
$40 billion (DHS, 2019). It should be noted that each of these departments were created in the 
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wake of specific events: the EPA following a number of large-scale pollution incidents, the DOE 
following the 1973 oil shortage, and DHS after the 9/11 terror attacks (Spezio, 2018; DOE, 
1994). 
Another potential funding source may be settlements from litigation against major 
contributors to GHG emissions. A number of cities and states have already filed suit against 
fossil fuel companies, alleging fraud, violations of state law, and negligence (Hasemyer, 2019). 
Should the President instruct the Department of Justice to join existing suits or file new ones, 
significant portions of settlements and/or penalties from the ensuing litigation could be directed 
to the new Office of Coastal Resilience, following the model of the CPRA. Though this may not 
be a sustainable funding source in the long-term, it would likely provide a large sum in the 
short-term. However, there is no way to predict the settlement amount, given the lack of 
precedent. Even more importantly, there is no certainty that such a case would turn out favorably 
for the government – in fact, given the lack of success of state and city efforts thus far, it may 
very well be unlikely.  
Though it is impossible to accurately project Congressional appropriations for a proposed 
agency, let alone potential legal settlement amounts, history shows that Congress is prone to 
appropriate several billion dollars to new departments, while steadily increasing appropriations 
in the years that follow. Though this is promising, it remains to be seen whether this will provide 
sufficient funding for coastal adaptation and resilience efforts. 
  
 
Project Appropriation 
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 Similar to the case with coastal protection funding in Louisiana, the consolidation of 
resources would likely allow higher-cost projects to be funded. This could allow for more 
high-cost initiatives to be implemented. However, this may in turn neglect smaller projects. 
Having a larger pool of money with less grant recipients may also put smaller communities at a 
disadvantage. Many small communities may not have the resources or expertise to effectively 
apply for large, complex federal grants. Consolidating resources may further perpetuate this 
issue. 
 If the new agency uses cutting-edge climate science and projections to choose grant 
recipients, as the CPRA does, this could make it much more effective. As has been noted 
previously, FEMA’s current grant programs are plagued by a lack of transparency, and do not 
necessarily take future climate risk into account. Changing this could promote high-impact 
projects that provide the most benefits going forward, and would eliminate politically-motivated 
project funding. 
  
Elevation of the Issue of Coastal Resilience 
 Having an administrator dedicated to resilience would certainly elevate the issue of 
adaptation and resilience generally. As has been the case in Louisiana, having an agency and 
position dedicated to coastal resilience would increase the profile of the issue and provide the 
federal government with a point person on actions related to climate resilience. However, it is 
difficult to say whether this would affect any changes in public opinion. 
  
 
 
Will the proposal plausibly gain Congressional approval? 
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 The answer to this question is dependent on a number of factors. These include the 
makeup of Congress and the context of the proposal. As was mentioned, the EPA, DOE, and 
DHS were all formed in response to specific events. This likely increased public pressure on 
lawmakers to take action. This is backed up by the bipartisan support enjoyed by the acts which 
established both DOE and DHS. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 passed the House by a 
295-152 vote and the Senate by a tally of 90-9 (H.R. 5005, 2002). The act which established 
DOE in 1977 passed with votes of 310-20 in the House and 74-10 in the Senate (S.826, 1977). 
The formation of the EPA did not require a Congressional vote because President Nixon had 
Presidential reorganization authority. Prior to changes in the law, Presidential reorganization 
could occur without the explicit approval of Congress, though they were able to veto plans 
(Hogue, 2012). President Obama attempted to gain Presidential reorganization authority from 
Congress in 2012, but was blocked by Republicans despite initial bipartisan support (Kosar, 
2017). The President would likely have to cultivate a positive relationship with Congressional 
leaders from both parties in order to ensure the establishment of the new agency. This may be 
easier to accomplish in the wake of a significant natural disaster, based on the precedent of past 
agency establishment. 
  
Will the proposal have unintended negative or inequitable outcomes? 
 Consolidating coastal resilience efforts under one agency may silo government-wide 
initiatives to increase resilience. It may, in effect, reduce the resilience-related functions of other 
agencies (Goodell, 2019). However, this may be mitigated to an extent by housing the agency 
under DHS and by staffing deputy administrators from other relevant agencies, which would 
presumably aid cross-agency collaboration. This proposal may also increase the disparities 
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between smaller, less well-endowed communities, and larger ones with more resources. 
Resource consolidation may increase awards but decrease the number of awardees, as 
higher-cost projects are funded. This will increase competition for grants, giving well-planned 
proposals an advantage. Communities that do not have the resources needed to conduct detailed 
studies, produce localized climate projections, and engage experts will therefore be 
disadvantaged. Given current wealth disparities in America, this could disproportionately harm 
minority communities. 
 
 
Conclusion: Final Recommendations 
  
  
 Climate change will greatly impact the U.S. coastline in the near-, medium-, and 
long-term future. Localities urgently need to adapt and build resilience to these projected 
impacts. Yet many have not, due prominently to a lack of necessary resources. States, the testing 
grounds of new and innovative policies, have, for the most part, similarly failed to step up to the 
challenge. The federal government has begun to work towards building coastal resilience, but 
has not yet done enough and in some cases even administers policies that are detrimental to the 
goal. There must be a new and improved approach to building coastal resilience. In light of the 
analysis presented in this thesis, the following recommendations are made: 
The President should seek Congressional approval to create a new agency dedicated 
to resilience, to be housed under DHS. The agency should include an Office of Coastal 
Resilience and should consolidate existing relevant offices and funding sources. The agency 
should utilize climate science to inform funding decisions. The agency should also appoint 
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deputy administrators who concurrently hold other positions in federal departments.​ An 
agency and corresponding administrator for resilience could provide a number of benefits, both 
in terms of opinion and perception of the issue, and in physically increasing coastal resilience 
through targeted, high-impact projects. Housing the agency under DHS would be a natural fit, 
due to the Department’s commitment to national security and public safety. To mitigate the 
potential siloing of federal resilience efforts, deputy administrators should concurrently hold 
other positions in relevant agencies, departments, or offices. These could include the Department 
of Commerce, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, and the Department of Transportation. 
FEMA should phase in 500-year floodplain standards for the NFIP over a set period 
of time, and remove non-compliant policyholders from the NFIP.​ ​Congress should act 
quickly to approve resilience tax credits for low-income NFIP policyholders to help them 
comply with the new mandatory minimum standards. FEMA should also follow through on 
the implementation of the NFIP’s Risk Rating 2.0 to increase resilience and equity.​ ​The 
NFIP incentivizes development in high-risk areas by not pricing premiums commensurately with 
past risk, let alone current or future risk. This issue is exacerbated by the relatively weak 
minimum standards enforced by the NFIP and CRS. Increasing premiums, as Risk Rating 2.0 
will do, will show homeowners the true risk of living in a given area, which will theoretically 
influence behavioral changes. The new methodology will also help reduce current inequities 
between low- and high-income homeowners. Increasing minimum standards will increase 
resilience to coastal flooding impacts. It will also likely reduce NFIP expenditures, as less 
policyholders will suffer damages. Approving tax credits aimed at low-income policyholders will 
Horowitz 66 
ensure that they are able to comply with the new standards. However, there is likely to be much 
Congressional outcry based on precedent. This may force reforms to be abridged or weakened. 
Even in the absence of NFIP reforms, ​Congress should still approve tax credits for 
resilience, modeled on the Disaster Savings and Resilient Construction Act of 2018 and on 
energy efficiency tax credits.​ Similar tax credits have been shown to influence consumer 
behavior. Implementing a tax credit for resilient retrofits could help low-income homeowners 
and incentivize higher-income homeowners to prepare their properties for climate impacts. 
However, ​Congress must ensure that tax credits are available ​proactively​, and not only to 
communities in a federally declared disaster area​. Building resilience before a disaster strikes 
will maximize benefits and minimize the loss of life and property. Congress should also consider 
an expanded definition of resilient retrofits that takes coastal inundation and storm surge into 
account. 
FWS should identify areas which may be amenable to CBRA expansion​. The CBRA 
has generated a significant amount of financial benefits for the federal government since its 
inception. As rising sea levels and changing hurricane patterns expand the scope of vulnerable 
coastal areas, FWS should study where those areas may be and if the CBRA could be applied to 
new domains. This will not only protect lives and property by protecting naturally-occurring 
“green infrastructure”, but will limit federal disaster-related spending as well. FWS should then 
work in concert with Congress to expand CBRA areas. 
FEMA should add a credit to proposed Disaster Deductible  that would incentivize 
states to create CPRA-like authorities, and should continue to refine the Disaster 
Deductible in cooperation with Congress and state partners​. In its current form, the disaster 
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deductible does not do enough build coastal resilience through incentivization. Adding an 
additional credit that could be applied to a state’s deductible if they create an authority similar to 
the CPRA would incentivize states to make the large-scale adaptation efforts needed to prepare 
for climate change. However, a number of outstanding problems remain. FEMA must first 
determine if the deductible would necessitate the amending of the Stafford Act. FEMA should 
also strive to incorporate local actions into the deductible and credit structure. Finally, FEMA 
should reconsider, replace, or supplement the proposed calculations for state risk and fiscal 
capacity to more holistically represent risk and to ensure the fiscal capacity measure does not 
inadvertently incentivize poor management. This should be done in concert with state partners 
and Congress to ensure a broad base of support and the incorporation of concerns. 
These recommendations are by no means an assured or complete solution. Climate projections, 
as with all scientific projections, are variable, and impacts may be worse or occur sooner than 
currently thought. Nevertheless, the federal government must step up where states and localities 
are failing. In order to ensure the protection of people, property, and entire economies in the face 
of climate change, the federal government must take action. The above recommendations can be 
completed through agency regulation, presidential action, and Congressional legislation. These 
broad suite of solutions, which are both short- and long-term, can help coastal communities 
prepare for the impacts of climate change. 
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